Tacit Collusion in Price-Setting Duopoly Markets: Experimental Evidence

We study the effect of demand structure on the ability of subjects to tacitly collude on prices by considering Bertrand substitutes and Bertrand complements. We find evidence of collusion in the complements treatment, but no such evidence in the substitutes treatment. This finding is somewhat in contrast with Potters and Suetens (2007) who observe tacit collusion in two treatments with similar underlying demand structures but with no market context.

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Year of publication:	2008-07-10
Authors:	Anderson, Lisa R. ; Freeborn, Beth A. ; Holt, Charles A.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, College of William & Mary
Subject:	collusion \| Bertrand \| experiment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 73 18 pages
Classification:	C9 - Design of Experiments ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168598