Task assignment and pay dispersion under moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Löffler, Clemens ; Schmid, Christian |
Subject: | Efficiency in risk bearing | Incentive compensation | Pay dispersion | Performance measurement | Risk aversion | Task assignment | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Lohnstruktur | Wage structure | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Performance-Messung | Risiko | Risk |
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