Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model

This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Borck, Rainald
Institutions:	DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)
Subject:	tax competition \| voting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin. - ISSN 1619-4535.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 335 11 pages long
Classification:	H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963839