Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model

This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Borck, Rainald
Publisher:	Berlin : Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Subject:	Steuerwettbewerb \| Steuersystem \| Public Choice \| Abstimmungsregel \| Theorie \| tax competition \| voting

More details

Series:	DIW Discussion Papers ; 335
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	849707862 [GVK] hdl:10419/18071 [Handle] RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp335 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260659