Telling the truth may not pay off: an empirical study of centralised university admissions in Germany

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school (Abiturbestenverfahren, Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen) and on waiting time (Wartezeitverfahren). While these procedures differ in the criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences. Thus, strategic behaviour is expected. Using the full data set of applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to organize the market are briefly discussed.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Braun, Sebastian ; Dwenger, Nadja ; Kübler, Dorothea
Publisher:	Berlin : Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Subject:	Studienfach \| Berufswahl \| Zentrale Organisation \| Matching \| Spieltheorie \| Deutschland \| university admissions \| strategic behaviour

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	DIW Discussion Papers ; 759
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	55754937X [GVK] hdl:10419/27283 [Handle] RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp759 [RePEc]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; I29 - Education. Other
Source:	EconStor