The balanced solutionfor cooperative transferable utility games

The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividendof each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weightsfor all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividendsproportionally to their weights. In this contribution we de¯ne the balanced solutionwhich assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley valueof each player is equal to her weight. We prove its existence for all monotonetransferable utility games, discuss other properties of this solution, and deal withits characterization through a reduced game consistency.

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Year of publication:	2007-10-10
Authors:	Brink, René van den ; Levínský, René ; Zeleny, Miroslav
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| game theory \| Nutzenmaximierung \| Shapley-Lösung \| Weight- ed Shapley value \| Kooperatives Verhalten \| Cheap talk communication

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Extent:	698368 bytes 28 p. application/pdf
Series:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Papers on Strategic Interaction Jena Economic Research Papers ; 073 (2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISSN:	1864-7057
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; Business administration. Other aspects ; Simulation methods ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)