The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

For each outcome (i.e.~a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent - is employed.

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Year of publication:	2001-10-03
Authors:	Kóczy, László Á. ; Lauwers, Luc
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Coalition structure \| core-extension \| non-emptiness \| dominance

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: none 8 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407594