The commitment effect in belief evolution

In this note we establish that rational demand expectations willtypically not evolve in an evolutionary model. In an evolutionarymodel beliefs act like a commitment device to more aggressive be-havior. This commitment effect has the same direction for strategicsubstitutes and complements and fades away in large markets.

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Year of publication:	2003-09-01
Authors:	Gehring, Thomas ; Güth, Werner ; René Levínský
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Entscheidungstheorie \| decision theory \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Erwartungsbildung \| Selbstbindung \| Rationalität \| rational behaviour

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Extent:	188416 bytes 10 p. application/pdf
Series:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Papers on Strategic Interaction Discussion Paper ; 0317 (2003)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Forecast, decision making ; Sociological and psychological aspects ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866911