The Consequences of Overlapping Tax Bases for Redistribution and Public Spending in a Federation.
Tax and expenditure policies are studied in a federation with mperfectly mobile households. States implement a linear progressive tax and supply a public good. A vertical fiscal externality, reflecting the effect of the state policies on federal revenues, provides an incentive to state taxes to be too progressive. A horizontal fiscal externality causes non-optimal states taxes and expenditures on the migration effect.
Year of publication: |
1998
|
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Authors: | Boadway, R. ; Marchand, M. ; Vigneault, M. |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | TAXATION |
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