The dynamic evolution of preferences

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Heifetz, Aviad ; Shannon, Chris ; Spiegel, Yossi
Publisher:	Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Subject:	Präferenztheorie \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Theorie

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Series:	Discussion Paper ; 1415
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	587462280 [GVK] hdl:10419/31223 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1415 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266303