The Dynamical Stability for an Evolutionary Language Game under Selection-Mutation Dynamics

We present complete results pertaining to the dynamical stability for sender-receiver games following Lewis (1969), and Nowak and Krakauer (1999) under the selection-mutation dynamics. Our research reveals that two distinct classes of neutrally stable strategies have a distinguishing feature of the dynamic stability. The rest points close to the strategies of these classes are asymptotically stable and all rest points other than these are not

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Uchida, Seigo
Other Persons:	Fukuzumi, Masakazu (contributor)
Publisher:	[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Evolutionary game theory \| Sprache \| Language \| Evolutionsökonomik \| Evolutionary economics \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (47 p)
Series:	Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER) Paper ; No. 115
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER) Paper No. 115 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 22, 2017 erstellt
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945160