The Efficiency of Negotiations with Uncertainty and Multi-Dimensional Deals

We develop a theory of negotiation in which deals have multiple dimensions that can be bundled together. We use theory and experiments to show that in such settings efficient trade is possible even with substantial asymmetric information. The benefits of identifying areas of mutual gain guide agents away from posturing and manipulating their share of the pie, and instead to finding the deals that maximize their mutual gains from trade

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Jackson, Matthew O.
Other Persons:	Sonnenschein, Hugo (contributor) ; Xing, Yiqing (contributor) ; Tombazos, Christis (contributor) ; Al-Ubaydli, Omar (contributor)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungen \| Negotiations \| Risiko \| Risk \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (60 p)
Series:	Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper ; No. 21-14
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 1, 2018 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3153853 [DOI]
Classification:	A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47 ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852563