The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy.

We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. We argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Faust, J. ; Svensson, L.E.O.
Institutions:	Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Stockholms Universitet
Subject:	MONETARY POLICY \| CENTRAL BANKS

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Series:	Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	24 pages
Classification:	E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669811