The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and the role of public randomization to move continuously across games within the same model.

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Year of publication:	2015-03-12
Authors:	Frei, Christoph ; Bernard, Benjamin
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - 2015
Publisher:	Econometric Society
Subject:	Folk theorem \| repeated games \| continuous time \| imperfect observability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199866