The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis

We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence. Our result encompasses theorems involving epsilon equilibria and incomplete information.

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Year of publication:	1999-02-03
Authors:	Benoit, Jean-Pierre ; Krishna, Vijay
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Folk Theorems \| Repeated Games

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Extent:	application/x-tex application/postscript application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on IBM PC/Scientific Workplace 3.0 ; to print on HP 4; pages: 36; figures: none. December 1998 version 36 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407622