The gains of ignoring risk : insurance with better informed principals

Laura Abrardi, Luca Colombo, Piero Tedeschi

We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative advantage over policyholders. We show that the presence of insurers privately and heterogeneously informed about risk can explain the concentration levels, the persistent profitability and the pooling of risk observed in some insurance markets. Furthermore, we find that a lower market concentration may entail an increase in insurance premia.

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Year of publication:	[2019]
Authors:	Abrardi, Laura ; Colombo, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero
Publisher:	Milano, Italy : Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Subject:	Insurance markets \| Asymmetric information \| Risk assessment \| Market concentration \| Theorie \| Theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Versicherungsmarkt \| Insurance market \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Risiko \| Risk

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Working paper series : working paper. - Milano, Italy : Dipartimento di economia e finanza, Università cattolica del Sacro Cuore, ISSN 2704-7407, ZDB-ID 2914245-3. - Vol. n. 84 (July 2019)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/225056 [Handle]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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