The Generalized Informativeness Principle

This paper shows that the informativeness principle, as originally formulated by Holmstrom (1979), does not hold if the first-order approach is invalid. We introduce a "generalized informativeness principle" that takes into account non-local incentive constraints and holds generically, even without the first-order approach. Our result holds for both separable and non-separable utility functions

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Chaigneau, Pierre
Other Persons:	Edmans, Alex (contributor) ; Gottlieb, Daniel (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Nutzenfunktion \| Utility function \| Informationswert \| Information value \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (20 p)
Series:	NBER Working Paper ; No. w20729
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 2014 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040535