The Group Size Paradox Revisited
<link rid="b9">Esteban and Ray (2001)</link> model an increasing marginal cost of effort in providing a public good. If the marginal cost of contribution function has an elasticity greater than 1, then the level of provision is increasing in group size, regardless of the degree of rivalry of the public good. We modify their model to a standard public goods setting, where their results continue to hold. We then add small fixed costs of participation to the model. If the good is sufficiently rival, one of <link rid="b12">Olson's (1965)</link> central propositions is restored: public goods will fail to be provided in large groups. Copyright © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | PECORINO, PAUL ; TEMIMI, AKRAM |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 10.2008, 5, p. 785-799
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Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
Saved in:
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