The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts

We analyze explicit and implicit contracts in a repeated principal-agent model with observable but only partially contractible actions of the agent. It is shown that the set of implementable actions may increase or decrease if additional actions become contractible.

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Year of publication:	1994-07
Authors:	Schnitzer, Monika
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	Implicit contracts \| repeated games

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Series:	Discussion Paper Serie A.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968140