The intriguing nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions

Axel Dreher and Lars Siemers

The paper develops a theoretical model showing a mutual relationship between corruption and capital account restrictions. According to the model, higher corruption induces stricter restrictions and vice versa. We test the model using panel data for 112 countries over the period 1984-2002 and find that corruption and restrictions are indeed mutually determined. Estimating the model simultaneously, capital account restrictions induce higher corruption. Higher corruption, in turn, is associated with more restrictions on the capital account. The empirical relationship is, however, not completely robust. -- corruption ; capital account restrictions ; dynamic panel

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Year of publication:	Nov. 2005
Other Persons:	Dreher, Axel (contributor) ; Siemers, Lars (contributor)
Publisher:	Zürich : KOF
Subject:	Korruption \| Corruption \| Kapitalbilanz \| Capital account \| Kapitalverkehrskontrolle \| Capital controls \| Schätzung \| Estimation \| 1984-2002

Extent:	Online-Ressource, 38 S., Text
Series:	KOF working papers. - Zürich : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2107617-0. - Vol. 113
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/50879 [Handle]
Classification:	C33 - Models with Panel Data ; D19 - Household Behavior and Family Economics. Other ; F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions ; G11 - Portfolio Choice ; H26 - Tax Evasion ; O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003289319