The Macroeconomics of Delegated Management
Year of publication: |
2003-06-25
|
---|---|
Authors: | Danthine, Jean-Pierre ; Donaldson, John B. |
Publisher: |
International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering (FAME) <Genf> |
Subject: | Agency-Theorie | Führungskraft | Kontrakttheorie | Delegation | delegation | Anteilseigner | Managementvertrag |
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The framework and modelling issues
- 3. A generic conflict of interests
- 4. Optimal contracting: sharecropping
- 5. Contracts based on the firm´s operating results
- 6. Renumerating the manager on the basis of the firm´s market value
- 7. Conclusions
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