The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core

We settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game. We prove that its core is always nonempty for all possible joint distributions of the random demands. We give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton, or at a core allocation every newsvendor shares a nonnegative cost

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Müller, Alfred
Other Persons:	Scarsini, Marco (contributor) ; Shaked, Moshe (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Core \| Lagerhaltungsmodell \| Inventory model \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2002 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2002 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109269