The One-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality

In this paper we present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with the concept of sequential equilibrium and related concepts of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. A weak consistency condition which is sufficient to obtain an analogy to the well-known One-Deviation Principle for subgame perfect equilibrium is given.

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Year of publication:	1992-07
Authors:	: Ebbe Hendon ; Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen ; Sloth, Birgitte
Institutions:	Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 92-05 12 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749736