The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum

The paper proves existence of equilibrium in a fairly general version of the pre-marital investment game. The game has discontinuous payoffs, so the method of Reny (1999) is used. Three assumptions are imposed on the matching process that occurs after investments are realized. It must be assortative, it must resolve ties efficiently, and it must not allow externalities.

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Year of publication:	2005-12-16
Authors:	Peters, Michael
Institutions:	Vancouver School of Economics
Subject:	pre-marital investment \| assortative matching \| equilibrium in discontinuous games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Microeconomics.ca working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	8 pages
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970948