The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Hinloopen, Jeroen
Publisher:	Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Cartel stability \| detection probabilities \| statue of limitation.

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Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 05-104/1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	83718892X [GVK] hdl:10419/86354 [Handle] RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050104 [RePEc]
Classification:	K21 - Antitrust Law ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325316