The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | D'Haultfœuille, Xavier ; Février, Philippe |
Published in: |
Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 1759-7331, ZDB-ID 2569569-1. - Vol. 11.2020, 1, p. 349-397
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Subject: | Incentives | asymmetric information | optimal contracts | nonparametric identification | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Nichtparametrisches Verfahren | Nonparametric statistics | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/QE597 [DOI] hdl:10419/217190 [Handle] |
Classification: | C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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