THE SHAPLEY VALUE, THE OWEN VALUE, AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE

We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not show this property.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	CASAJUS, ANDRÉ
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 11.2009, 04, p. 453-457
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Shapley value \| Owen value \| Banzhaf value \| extension \| consistency

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475664