The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models

Wendelin Schnedler

A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Schnedler, Wendelin
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Adverse selection \| statistical discrimination \| stochastic order relation \| Adverse Selektion \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Arbeitsproduktivität \| Labour productivity \| Stochastischer Prozess \| Stochastic process \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	Online-Ressource ([1], 11 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion paper series / IZA. - Bonn : IZA, ZDB-ID 2120053-1. - Vol. 342
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/21200 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J71 - Discrimination
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403219