Through trial & error to collusion

Steffen Huck; Jörg Oechssler; Hans-Theo Normann

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Huck, Steffen ; Oechssler, Joerg ; Normann, Hans-Theo
Institutions:	Sonderforschungsbereich Quantifikation und Simulation Ökonomischer Prozesse (contributor)
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt-Universität
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 13 S., 1,53 MB)
Series:	Discussion papers of interdisciplinary research project 373. - Berlin : Humboldt-Universität, ISSN 1436-1086, ZDB-ID 2135319-0. - Vol. 1999,57
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/61755 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580461