Time-Consistent Carbon Pricing : The Role of Carbon Contracts for Differences

Carbon pricing decisions by governments are prone to time-inconsistency, which causes the private sector to underinvest in emission-reducing technologies. We show that incentives for decarbonization can be improved if complementing carbon pricing with carbon contracts for differences, where the government commits to pay a ﬁxed carbon price level to the investors. We derive conditions under which the government is willing to “tie its hands” with the contracts

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Chiappinelli, Olga
Other Persons:	Neuhoff, Karsten (contributor)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Treibhausgas-Emissionen \| Greenhouse gas emissions \| Ökosteuer \| Environmental tax \| Emissionshandel \| Emissions trading \| Theorie \| Theory \| Klimaschutz \| Climate protection

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
Series:	DIW Berlin Discussion Paper ; No. 1859
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2020 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3576402 [DOI]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; L51 - Economics of Regulation ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Q58 - Government Policy
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836909