To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes

In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes with the level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. Finally, we study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal.

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Year of publication:	2005-08-03
Authors:	Celik, Gorkem ; Sayan, Serdar
Institutions:	Vancouver School of Economics
Subject:	Corruption \| Law Enforcement

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Microeconomics.ca working papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	24 pages
Classification:	K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980433