Tournaments and Office Politics:Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment

In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhapswhen workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability andoutput in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect oftournaments is thin...

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Year of publication:	2007-08-01
Authors:	Carpenter, Jeffrey P. ; Matthews, Peter Hans ; Schirm, John
Institutions:	Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn>
Subject:	Experiment \| Experiments \| Wettkampf \| Tournaments \| Anreiz \| Sabotage

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Extent:	252928 bytes 31 p. application/pdf
Series:	IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Discussion Papers IZA Discussion Paper ; No. 2972 (2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; Personnel management, Personnel planning and Personnel development ; Ergonomic job analysis ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862319