Tuning unemployment insurance to the business cycle : unemploymenr insurance generosity should be greater when unemployment is high and vice versa

Torben M. Andersen (Aarhus University, Denmark, and IZA, Germany)

High unemployment and its social and economic consequences have lent urgency to the question of how to improve unemployment insurance in bad times without jeopardizing incentives to work or public finances in the medium term. A possible solution is a rule-based system that improves the generosity of unemployment insurance (replacement rate, benefit duration, eligibility conditions) when unemployment is high and reduces the generosity when it is low.

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Year of publication:	May 2014
Authors:	Andersen, Torben M.
Publisher:	Bonn : Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA)
Subject:	unemployment benefits \| insurance \| incentives \| automatic stabilizers \| Arbeitslosenversicherung \| Unemployment insurance \| Konjunktur \| Business cycle \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Arbeitslosigkeit \| Unemployment

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	IZA world of labor : evidence-based policy making. - Bonn : Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), ISSN 2054-9571, ZDB-ID 2844052-3. - Vol. 2014,54
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.15185/izawol.54 [DOI] hdl:10419/125278 [Handle]
Classification:	J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies ; H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417280