Turning a Blind Eye: Costly Enforcement,Credible Commitment and Minimum Wage Laws

In many countries, non-compliance with minimum wage legislation is widespread, andauthorities may be seen as having turned a blind eye to a legislation that they havethemselves passed. But if enforcement is imperfect, how effective can a minimum wage be?And if non-compliance is widespread, why not revise the minimum wage?..

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Year of publication:	2007-08-01
Authors:	Basu, Arnab K. ; Chau, Nancy H. ; Kanbur, Ravi
Institutions:	Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn>
Subject:	Öffentliche Verwaltung \| public administration \| Effizienz \| Mindestlohn \| Dynamische Konsistenz \| dynamic consistency \| Nichterfüllung \| noncompliance

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Extent:	359424 bytes 37 p. application/pdf
Series:	IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Discussion Papers IZA Discussion Paper ; No. 2998 (2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D6 - Welfare Economics ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; J38 - Public Policy ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005862301