Two kinds of voting procedures manipulability : strategic voting and strategic nomination

Frantisek Turnovec

In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Turnovec, František
Publisher:	Prague : Inst. of Economic Studies, Fac. of Social Sciences, Charles Univ. of Prague
Subject:	Arrow's theorem \| dictatorship \| Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem \| manipulation \| Pareto efficiency \| strategic voting \| strategic nomination \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Unmöglichkeitstheorem \| Impossibility theorem \| Manipulation \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Pareto-Optimum \| Diktatur \| Dictatorship \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (9 S.)
Series:	IES working paper. - Praha : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2408568-6. - Vol. 11/2015
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/120441 [Handle]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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