UNDERSTANDING PRODUCTION CONTRACTS: TESTING AN AGENCY THEORY MODEL

Production contracts are increasingly important in American agriculture. Unfortunately, little is known about the fundamental forces governing their adoption and design. In order to better-understand the underlying incentives, we construct and test an agency-theoretic model of broiler production contracts. We discuss the analysis' implications for industry participants and government policy.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Goodhue, Rachael E. ; Rausser, Gordon C. ; Simon, Leo K.
Institutions:	Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA
Subject:	Industrial Organization \| Livestock Production/Industries

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT Number 20946
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005536476