Unilateral Appointments of Arbitrators : Perverse Incentives in International Arbitration?

The proper constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal will determine the validity and enforceability of an award. This paper deals with the different problematics that multi arbitrator tribunals, in specific those panels formed under the scheme of party appointed arbitrators can face during the proceedings, analyzing the possibility of reducing the perverse incentives that an arbitrator might have in ruling in favor of his nominating party

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Duarte, Herman
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit \| International commercial arbitration \| Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit \| Arbitration \| Theorie \| Theory \| Welt \| World
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] ; Abstract [doi.org]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Series:	Latin American and the Caribbean Law and Economics Association Annual Conference, XVI edition
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 20, 2012 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2063186 [DOI]
Classification:	K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior ; K00 - Law and Economics. General ; K10 - Basic Areas of Law. General ; L19 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. Other ; K20 - Regulation and Business Law. General ; K29 - Regulation and Business Law. Other ; K30 - Other Substantive Areas of Law. General ; K33 - International Law ; K39 - Other Substantive Areas of Law. Other ; K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. General ; K41 - Litigation Process ; K49 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. Other
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036880