Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ewerhart, Christian
Publisher:	Zurich : University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Subject:	Rent-seeking \| Private information \| Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium \| Existence \| Uniqueness

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Series:	Working Paper ; 159
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5167/uzh-96176 [DOI] 787629634 [GVK] hdl:10419/111208 [Handle] RePEc:zur:econwp:159 [RePEc]
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282485