Unitary, Divisional, And Matrix Forms As Political Governance Systems

In this study I reassess a set of fundamental organization forms (unitary, divisional, and matrix) as agenda-setting and political governance systems. My method of analysis is based on how political scientists study agendas in committees. Specifically, I first recount that moving from a functional (unitary) to a product-line (divisional) structure increases the types of conflict referred from lower to higher levels of the hierarchy, but does not increase the amount of conflict referred. I then show that moving from a product-line to a matrix structure increases the amount and the types of conflict referred to higher levels of the hierarchy; that it is possible in matrix forms that no conflict is resolved at the lowest levels of the hierarchy; and, that accountability is reduced for those who are able to refer conflict. The study reveals implications for matrix forms that derive from this view of organizations as agenda-setting and political governance systems. This analysis fits with the recent history of matrix forms in a variety of organizations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006