Value, complement reduction and interval TU games

In the framework of interval transferable-utility (TU) games, we introduce a generalization of the equal allocation of nonseparable cost (EANSC). Further, we extend the reduced game introduced by Moulin (1985) to interval TU games. By applying this extended reduction, two axiomatizations of this extended EANSC are proposed.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Liao, Yu-hsien
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 30.2010, 4, p. 2671-2679
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Interval TU games \| the equal allocation of nonseparable cost \| reduced game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008677889