Venture Capital, Double-sided Adverse Selection, and Double-sided Moral Hazard

The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the entrepreneurs and venture capitalists effort, and the signals each player has revealed about his private information regarding the projects perspectives. This property can be used to induce both players to reveal their private information truthfully and to spend the efficient effort. This result holds irrespective of the assumed distribution function of the states of nature. The model is consistent with the observation that conversion is often automatic and that there is an inverse correlation between risk and control rights.

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Year of publication:	2002-03-01
Authors:	Houben, Eike
Publisher:	Universität <Kiel> / Lehrstuhl für Finanzwirtschaft
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Risikokapital \| risk capital \| Fremdfinanzierung

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Extent:	147456 bytes 33 p. application/pdf
Series:	Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel - Lehrstuhl für Finanzwirtschaft - Arbeitspapiere und Manuskripte Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre ; 556 (2002)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Corporate finance and investment policy. General ; Procurement of outside capital ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005840141