Veto-based delegation

Tymofiy Mylovanov

In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: (1) to design the default outcome and (2) to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions.

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Year of publication:	2005 ; First version: October 2004, this version: January 2005
Authors:	Mylovanov, Tymofiy
Publisher:	Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	veto power \| asymmetric information \| principal-agent relationship \| no monetary transfers \| Theorie \| Theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Veto

Extent:	Online-Ressource ([1], 19 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 129
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/94014 [Handle]
Classification:	D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373505