Vote buying I: legislatures and lobbying

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec-tion. We analyze the role of the parties.and voters.preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Dekel, Eddie ; Jackson, Matthew O. ; Wolinsky, Asher
Publisher:	Evanston : Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Subject:	Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Politische Partei \| Spieltheorie \| Wahl \| Wahlverhalten \| Theorie \| vote buying \| political economy \| campaign promises

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Series:	Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science ; 1434
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	587536977 [GVK] hdl:10419/31254 [Handle]
Classification:	P16 - Political Economy ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266330