Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying

We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Dekel, Eddie ; Jackson, Matthew O. ; Wolinsky, Asher
Publisher:	Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Subject:	Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Politische Partei \| Spieltheorie \| Wahl \| Wahlverhalten \| Theorie \| vote buying \| lobbying \| legislatures \| political economy

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Series:	Discussion Paper ; 1433
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	587536950 [GVK] hdl:10419/31252 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1433 [RePEc]
Classification:	P16 - Political Economy ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266328