Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution

This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Borck, Rainald
Institutions:	DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)
Subject:	Inequality \| Redistribution \| Voting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin. - ISSN 1619-4535.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 503 25 pages long
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; O15 - Human Resources; Income Distribution; Migration
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963760