Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion

This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Borck, Rainald
Institutions:	DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung)
Subject:	Tax evasion \| redistribution \| voting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin. - ISSN 1619-4535.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 329 21 pages long
Classification:	H26 - Tax Evasion ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963776