Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion

This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Borck, Rainald
Publisher:	Berlin : Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
Subject:	Einkommensumverteilung \| Einkommensteuerpolitik \| Abstimmung \| Steuervermeidung \| Theorie \| Tax evasion \| redistribution \| voting

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Series:	DIW Discussion Papers ; 329
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	849560101 [GVK] hdl:10419/18065 [Handle] RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp329 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H26 - Tax Evasion
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260655