Wage bargaining and political strength in the public sector

This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Falch, Torberg ; Str?m, Bjarne
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Besoldung \| Lohnverhandlungstheorie \| Public Choice \| Macht \| Kommunalverwaltung \| Schätzung \| Norwegen \| public sector labor market \| wage bargaining \| political strength \| budgetary process

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 1629
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	509894321 [GVK] hdl:10419/19093 [Handle]
Classification:	H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261392