When the union hurts the workers : a positive analysis of immigration policy

This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Bellettini, Giorgio ; Ceroni, Carlotta Berti
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Einwanderung \| Migrationspolitik \| Lohnpolitik \| Gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad \| Wohlfahrtseffekt \| Interessenpolitik \| Public Choice \| Theorie

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 1421
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	484732897 [GVK] hdl:10419/18785 [Handle]
Classification:	J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers ; J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives Structure, and Effects ; F22 - International Migration
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261152