Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy

A 1999 reform allowed Italian Mayors to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax). Theoretical analysis suggests this should give incompetent Mayors a less costly way to hide themselves, so allowing them to be more easily re-elected. An empirical analysis on Piedmont municipalities confirms these hypotheses.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Bordignon, Massimo ; Piazza, Santino
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Gemeindesteuer \| Steuerpolitik \| Public Choice \| Finanzföderalismus \| Theorie \| Italien \| partial decentralization \| fiscal federalism \| transparency \| political behavior

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 3100
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	630457379 [GVK] hdl:10419/38915 [Handle]
Classification:	H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270475